

Peace Processes from 1988-1998: Changing Patterns*

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Abstract

During the eleven years between 1988 and 1998, formal peace agreements have been signed between combatants in over thirty countries experiencing internal, mainly ethnic, conflicts. This quantity is unprecedented, particularly as most were the result of internally agreed initiatives rather than settlements imposed by external powers. Most of the peace agreements share a remarkably similar structure, focusing mainly on the ending of violence, security arrangements and the process of political ratification. Tangential, but often key, elements such as human rights legislation, truth commissions, and socio-economic development appear less frequently. While all the peace accords considered in the article deal with internal conflicts, international organisations have intervened frequently in a variety of ways—good offices, contact groups, third-party mediation, multidimensional peace-building, and military peacekeeping—each of which impacts differently on the future of these agreements. This article represents an introductory analysis of these peace agreements carried out as a preliminary study for the ‘Coming out of Violence’ project, an in-depth investigation of peace processes involving academic partners in five countries working to a common methodology. It highlights some characteristics of the recent peace processes, and points to possible changes in the way peace may be managed in the future.

The Peace Agreements

We have investigated the global process of peacemaking through a comprehensive analysis of conflicts using the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook, Sollenberg’s 1997 list of accords, Economist Country Reports, and local news agencies. By studying the various conflicts and their commensurate peace processes, we were able to follow the establishment of written agreements. It was necessary to be selective in the examination of accords to determine which were substantive agreements that move beyond a cease-fire to include other issues detailed later. We also considered the importance and clout of parties to the deal. In the case of the Sudan, the 1997 Khartoum

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Agreement was a deal between five small political parties and militias with the government, yet it was a legitimate agreement despite its obvious attempt to weaken the bargaining position and unity of John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)/Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

While it was difficult to determine which accords were substantive and included significant actors, it was even more troublesome to define success and failure. It is quite frankly impossible to judge success and failure in an objective manner according to a uniform standard across all cases. Many of the agreements have not had sufficient time to mature and begin the implementation process. In some cases, the mere framework of a negotiation, that both sides are talking, is a success. In others such as Northern Ireland, more than two decades of talking was insufficient; a substantive agreement was an important first step but the process will be judged according to implementation of police reform, decommissioning, the new assembly, and cross-border contact. Likewise, the Dayton Accords were clearly successful at ending one of Europe's bloodiest wars, and have maintained a partitioned state of tension for over four years. Yet Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the region, remain a powder keg and little nation-building or reconciliation has been accomplished. While success and failure should be addressed in the future, it is our purpose here to catalogue the observable agreements reached, their composition, and the trends that it implies.

Signatures on an agreement are only a step within a peace process, and sometimes a relatively impermanent one. It is unusual for one agreement to cover comprehensively all of the issues in dispute; in fact, agreements are often confined to a few of the most immediate sticking points, notably the ending of violence. Thus, there is a distinction to be made between the failure of an agreement and the collapse of a process. For the purposes of this article, a peace agreement is defined as a formal arrangement designed to end a violent conflict. Those considered in the article are confined to accords which include the significant actors in a conflict and proceed beyond a simple cease-fire. They also focus on internal peace agreements, as opposed to treaties between countries.

The end of bi-polarity and ideological proxy wars has brought forth a proliferation of peace processes characterised by cease-fires and subsequent attempts at reaching political accommodation. Over the course of the eleven years between 1988 and 1998, at least thirty-eight formal peace accords were signed which aimed at resolving internal conflict in thirty-three countries. Some of these agreements were fresh attempts to resolve conflicts that had existed before and during the Cold War. In addition, peace agreements have been signed in conflicts that were much less affected by Cold War tensions, such as Northern Ireland, New Caledonia, and Western Sahara.

These agreements were not evenly spread geographically. Nineteen took place on the African continent and twelve of these involved Sub-Saharan African nations. Ten of the sixteen agreements with UN involvement occurred in Africa. It is also worth noting that the African agreements included several of the more successful attempts at conflict settlement, including those in South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique. Elsewhere, there were two each in South Asia and Central Asia/former Soviet Union, three apiece in Europe and East Asia/Pacific, four in the Middle East, and five in Latin America/Caribbean. To look at it from another aspect, most post-World War II conflicts have occurred in the Global South, and all but three agreements came from Third World or formerly Second World nations. Even those three—Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine—while politically first world countries, shared some characteristics of underdeveloped nations such as terrorism, high unemployment rates, and unequal distribution of wealth.

The United Nations was directly involved in sixteen of these thirty-eight accords; the other twenty-two had no substantive UN involvement. These latter cases exclude the partial involvement of UNDP, UNICEF, and other UN agencies, as distinct from the UN itself. Furthermore, there has been a significant shift away from UN involvement during the eleven years under study. In the five years from 1988 to 1992, six of the ten peace agreements (60%) were brokered with the direct involvement of the UN, but only ten of the twenty-eight agreements signed between 1993 and late 1998 (36%) were

associated with UN initiatives. The change in pattern has been accelerating; of the fifteen agreements reached since the start of 1996, only two (13%) involved the UN.

Table 1
Internal Peace Agreements:1988-1998ⁱ
(date of most important accord)

<u>UN</u>	<u>Non-UN (national)</u>	<u>Non-UN (sub-national)</u>
Angola I (1991)	Guinea-Bissau (1998)	Mali (1992)
Angola II (1994)	Sierra Leone (1997)	Niger (1995)
Mozambique (1992)	South Africa (1991)	Russia (1997)
Liberia (1995)	Sudan (1997)	Bangladesh (1997)
Namibia (1988)	Chad (1997)	New Caledonia (1998)
Rwanda (1993)	Djibouti (1994)	Philippines (Moro) (1996)
Ethiopia/Eritrea (1993)	Israel/Palestine I (1993)	Philippines (NDF) (1998)
Somalia I (1993)	Israel/Palestine II (1998)	Northern Ireland (1998)
Western Sahara I (1988)	Lebanon (1989)	Mexico (1996)
Western Sahara II (1997)	Afghanistan (1993)	
Cambodia (1991)	Somalia II (1997)	
Bosnia (1995)	Czech Rep./Slovakia (1992)	
El Salvador (1992)	Nicaragua (1995)	
Guatemala (1995)		
Haiti (1993)		
Tajikistan (1997)		

All of the signed agreements dealt with conflicts which were mainly concentrated within national boundaries, as distinct from wars between neighbouring countries. This does not mean that external powers were not involved in their settlement; indeed, none of the conflicts was free of external influence. Nor does it mean that all the conflicts concerned the entire geographical territory of a nation, as some were confined to a region within a nation state. By this perspective, twenty-nine were national pacts, while nine addressed sub-national disputes, usually between the state and an ethnic minority. Twelve elections were held as a direct or indirect result of the agreements, as well as three referenda.

Much of the conflict resolution and negotiation literature reflects issues of bargaining, rational actor problem-solving, and game theory. Much of this literature adopts a social-psychological approach, with important contributions from Sandole and van der Merwe,ⁱⁱ Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim,ⁱⁱⁱ Burton,^{iv} and Fisher and Ury.^v In addition, the field has broadened to include the roles of culture, interpersonal relationships and dynamics, and communication. Cohen,^{vi} Lederach,^{vii} and Avruch^{viii} have already formed a significant body of literature specifically on cultural aspects of negotiation.

There is already a substantial and rapidly growing literature on ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and conflict resolution (reviewed by Miall, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham^{ix}). Largely, this work has tended to either theoretical abstraction or case studies and lessons learned from practitioners. Both of these bodies of work are quite impressive, and concepts and best practices are increasingly making their way into international diplomatic circles.

The end of the Cold War has allowed a re-examination of international relations and methods of peacemaking. However, little empirical work exists on the subject of peace processes as a cross-national process. Important work has been carried out recently by Gurr,^x Geller and Singer,^{xi} Sollenberg,^{xii} PIOOM,^{xiii} and Stedman^{xiv} into the changing patterns of international violence. These studies have been supplemented by a welcome rise of interest into how it might be ended. Zartman^{xv} focused on negotiation within the process, while Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr^{xvi} explored multidimensional peace keeping in Cambodia and El Salvador, primarily from a UN perspective. Hampson's^{xvii} study of five peace settlements, again all involving the UN, singled out the role of third parties as especially important and laid proper emphasis on the importance of implementing as well as signing agreements.

Elements of an Accord

The broad trend towards negotiated settlement is significant generally, but it is also important to focus on recurrent elements within accords. While each conflict is based on a distinct culture, history, attitude, and social development, the issues confronted in peace accords are often quite similar. Cease-fires, the inclusion of armed participants in negotiations, disarmament, amnesty for political prisoners, and reform of the security branches of the government are almost universal themes. Internationally, the removal of foreign forces and the return of refugees often provide a dynamic, involving formerly hostile third-party states. Questions of autonomy, human rights, and truth and reconciliation are often considered within the accord, and elections or referenda are usually part of their implementation. Socio-economic development is featured in few accords, and cast in a secondary role where it appears.

1) Security Issues

All of the accords followed periods of more-or-less serious violence, usually between governments and segments within society. In general, governments sought to control rebel areas, to disarm and demobilise troops and weapons, to institute a cease-fire, to ban external military assistance, and to move the opposition from militant to political activity. However, some governments also saw the peace process as a way of weakening or defeating the opposition, and their tactics included co-opting splinter groups, rival opposition groups, and significant leaders through economic or political incentives. Georgian President Shevardnadze, for example, favoured a 'Bosnian model,' fusing force with negotiations regarding unrest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Similar, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to involve opposition leaders were attempted with the Joint Politico-Military Commission (CCPM) in Angola, the Joint Commission in Namibia, and the Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) in Mozambique. The Angolan Joint Commission was composed of the Government and National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), chaired by the UN under the auspices of the Special Representative with the US, Portugal, and Russia as observers "to watch over the implementation of all political, administrative and military provisions not yet implemented... to monitor the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to make the final decision on possible violations."^{xviii} However, since the "Joint Commission shall take its decisions by consensus,"^{xix} the body proved ineffective due to continued conflict between the two domestic forces.

Governments were more willing to make deals where the maintenance of state authority was not an issue, specifically in the sub-national cases. This in turn has tended to split the opposition into clear camps of hard-liners and moderates. Tuaregs in Mali voluntarily burned weapons in Timbuktu

after achieving autonomy, yet other nomadic and sedentary groups along the Mauritanian border then took up arms. In Niger, rebel groups split after 1,400 Tuaregs were integrated into the national army in 1996. Again, rebels laid down their weapons after accepting plans for economic rehabilitation. Autonomy in Mindanao served to further split the two major rebel groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 81-member Consultative Assembly was constituted to reserve 44 seats for the MNLF, making them the only legitimate political voice for Philippine Muslims, and severing each group's interests in working together. The Irish Republican Army's (IRA) inclusion in the peace process also isolated those outside the process like the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Continuity IRA, and the new 'Real IRA' which thus lacked popular support and sufficient military resources. In addition, an agreement to pay transit fees for an oil pipeline through Chechnya and promises of a referendum on Chechen status in 2001 has temporarily mollified the Chechen leadership's aspirations, along with their own de facto control over territory. Finally, the Referendum Act in New Caledonia, a notably less violent area, also looked forward to a referendum on self-determination.

The paramilitary groups, on the other hand, often seek new unified armed forces or the ability to police their own area, the release of prisoners, the return of refugees, human rights legislation or language, autonomy, a referendum, and perhaps international observers to monitor the process or elections. However, localised conflicts in which a minority grouping received some concessions may provoke a new conflict with other local population groups. Greater autonomy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh, while generally supported by the rebel group Shanti Bahini, has provoked an anti-government backlash by Bengali settlers. The CHT Peace Agreement states "The *parishad* will consist of 22 members, including its chairman. Two-thirds of the members will be elected from the tribals."^{xx} This sort of power-sharing arrangement often does not reflect the electoral demographics and risks a further backlash in several of these conflicts. Some unionists in Northern Ireland have also exhibited resentment to the 1998 Belfast Agreement. In Mexico, while violence and hostility were initially reduced in the Chiapas region during negotiations for the San Andres Accords, the Zapatista realisation that the congress would not enact legislation on autonomy and cultural rights led to a resumption of armed conflict and a concomitant increase in anti-Zapatista raids by locals, allegedly instigated by the state or federal authorities.

2) *Violence*

The ending of violence is often regarded as the principal objective in a peace process, or at least an important first step towards settlement. In many processes, including South Africa, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland, cease-fires were preceded by secret negotiations between the representatives of guerrillas and either government or other intermediaries. Even when secret negotiations led to cease-fires, the resulting talks were almost inevitably carried out to a background of disruptive and destabilising violence by more extreme spoiler groups and dissidents. This highlights differences

about whether security-related issues such as amnesties or the release of prisoners should be introduced at an early stage as confidence-building gestures for paramilitaries, or if arms decommissioning should be a pre-condition in order to reassure constitutional politicians. Much of the dialogue on timing is ambiguous, such as “the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees shall be accomplished at the earliest possible date.”^{xxi}

Serious negotiations often do not begin until each side has attempted to maximise their bargaining position through military offensives. Paramilitary groups often attempt to demonstrate their strength and staying power in order to persuade the government military victory is impossible. In Angola, both the opposition National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the government Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) fought military offensives to win back territory and deter the other from securing a military victory in preparation for negotiation. In the case of more established regimes like those in Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, Israel, Guatemala, and Cambodia; government policies shifted between limited and total warfare. The campaigns of militant rebels such as the MNLF in the Philippines, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Israel, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in Cambodia, and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) ultimately led to more forthright negotiations. However, new offensives can also interrupt the peace process, and did in Angola, Liberia, and Rwanda.

A key component of many settlements is the early release of prisoners. Some go further and include the integration of former combatants into the national armed forces and/or police, a transition often linked to the demobilisation of troops and decommissioning of weapons. A new unified armed forces was established in Angola under the Bicesse Accord. A proportional balance between the military was agreed in Mozambique, while the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the Southwest Africa territorial force were merged into a National Defense Force in Namibia with the help of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). There are plenty of other examples: Tuaregs in Niger, the new South African security arrangements, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in Tajikistan, the CGDK including some Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the amalgamation of the MNLF into the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These attempts at integration did not always succeed. Notable failures include those attempted by the Mondou Accord in Chad and the Conakry Accord in Sierra Leone. In Sudan, defecting troops fired on government troops they had recently joined; and in Rwanda, amalgamation was unable to prevent genocide. The cases of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Haiti provide a somewhat different lesson. There, investigation and reform of the security branches were achieved through an emphasis on civilian control, truth commissions, or budgetary reductions in the security apparatus, with particular importance attached to professionalising the police and the armed forces. In fact, a UN Mission was formed in El Salvador “to receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or body in El Salvador, containing reports of human rights violations; to visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice, and to use the media to the extent useful for its mandate.”^{xxii}

Even when negotiations get under way, the threat of a return to violence often becomes a serious obstacle to the process. Cease-fires never eliminate violence completely, and the continuation of violence may feed the distrust which is a feature of most internal peace negotiations. In particular, it takes time to remove the suspicion that those representing ex-paramilitants are prepared to call their soldiers into action to influence the negotiations or to remind other negotiators of their power.

3) *Political Ratification*

Opposition demands for autonomy, independence, and self-determination are a common underlying feature of negotiations, especially in sub-national cases. Governments are rarely amenable to conceding autonomy, although Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia and the Czech-Slovak ‘Velvet Divorce’ were interesting exceptions. Some level of autonomy or administrative devolution was agreed to in six agreements where no agreed autonomy had existed immediately prior to the accord

(Israel/Palestine I, Mali, Bangladesh, Philippines [Mindanao], Northern Ireland, and Mexico [not enacted by legislature]). In such cases, the agreement may be ratified by a popular vote, usually through an election and/or referendum. The Eritrean referendum on independence achieved a turnout of 99.8%. Seventy one per cent of voters in Northern Ireland, and 94% in the Republic of Ireland, approved the 1998 peace plan. New Caledonia and Mindanao (the Philippines) held one in 1988 and 1989 respectively, while Chechnya and Western Sahara are making plans for upcoming referenda.

Of twelve elections directly resulting from the peace accord, six were won by the government (Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Chad, El Salvador, and Nicaragua), two by the opposition (South Africa and Cambodia [later compromised]), and four were in areas which had no previous consensual government (Namibia, Mindanao, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland). Turnout was usually high: 98% in Namibia (1989), 87% in Mozambique (1994), 91% in Angola (1992), 91% in Cambodia (1993), although the results of the latter two were not adhered to beyond election day. Elections were viewed as the climax of the peace process in Angola and Cambodia, and especially in Liberia and Mozambique where the electoral mandate allowed the victors to supplant the negotiated peace and justify repression. Clearly, democracy in itself does not assure peace in divided communities. Consequently several processes, including Lebanon, Somalia, Bangladesh, Northern Ireland, and the Philippines (Mindanao), have chosen a power-sharing arrangement at various levels of government.

4) *Beyond Political Issues*

In many cases, the accords outlawed discrimination or recognised the rights of a group to exist, while some countries have taken the further step of forming truth and reconciliation commissions. The Philippines agreement with the Communists and the agreements in Latin America placed a special emphasis on the protection of human rights—indeed Guatemala has probably the most extensive consideration of human and indigenous rights of any agreement. Reconciliation commissions were incorporated into the agreements in Mozambique and South Africa, and discussed in Chad. Discriminatory legislation was repealed in South Africa and Namibia, and a Victims Commissioner was appointed in Northern Ireland.

In Northern Ireland, as in many other places, the peace agreement went far beyond political and constitutional agreement, including undertakings to review security arrangements, emergency legislation, and the criminal justice system, as well as policing. In addition, the return of refugees and removal of foreign forces are often causes of serious contention. Refugees are generally seen as a potential destabilising force in the country they occupy, usually a border state, with Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, Malians in Nigeria, Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan, Chakma in India, as well as many others throughout the Balkans and Central America. In some cases, the refugee camps provided safe-haven for opposition militants. However, most of the refugee population simply

attempt to exist with the support of international humanitarian aid, awaiting their safe return home. Similarly disturbing can be the presence of foreign troops, such as Cubans in Angola, South Africans in Namibia, Israelis and Syrians in Lebanon, and Vietnamese in Cambodia. The removal of foreign troops may also signal the beginning of a normalisation process, and marks an important step towards order and stability, and the localisation of a conflict.

5) *Socio-economic Considerations*

In some cases, the need for economic investment and development are regarded as an essential method of cementing a fragile peace, or at least a mitigator of violent conflict. The Guatemalan peace accords went the furthest in addressing the socio-economic roots of conflict such as land reform: "a firm and lasting peace must be consolidated on the basis of social and economic development... This is necessary in order to overcome the poverty, extreme poverty, discrimination and social and political marginalisation which have impeded and distorted the country's social, economic, cultural and political development and have represented a source of conflict and instability."^{xiii} Implementation is another matter, and the 'Peace Dividends' which were expected to follow the ending of violence in the Palestinian Authority and in South Africa were disappointing. Indeed, the economic expectations which are routinely raised to encourage progress during peace processes are often frustrated after they are signed. The inability of the Palestinian and South African administrations to implement speedy improvements in housing, employment, and general prosperity led to increased levels of social and political discontent. Crime statistics in South Africa have soared. More than 500 white farmers were killed in 2,400 attacks on farms since the 1994 elections, and crime has become a major post-settlement problem. By way of contrast, Northern Ireland benefited initially from substantial European Union grants to buttress the negotiations from 1994, and from increased external investments; tourist revenue rose by 30% in the year following the 1994 cease-fires.

In other settings it sometimes appeared that the need for peace and the need for investment and economic support were in direct competition. For example, while the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised Western Sahara in 1984, nine African states have withdrawn their recognition in exchange for financial assistance from Morocco. Similar financial and economic aspects creep into other conflicts such as China/Taiwan (over diplomatic recognition), Russia/Chechnya (over oil and pipeline), and Azerbaijan/Armenia (over oil).

The Role of International Organisations

Over the eleven years, the number of UN-brokered agreements has declined in relation to other approaches to peace accords. The processes in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, and Angola may be regarded as test cases for the UN in realising a new post Cold War world order. These were attempts to reconstruct and rehabilitate national institutions, identity, and government in a comprehensive manner. To varying degrees, UN missions were expanded to include political, administrative, security, and sometimes economic affairs. The UN was thrust into the most difficult of situations, and the record is mixed. The most notable failure was Rwanda where the UN's limited initial role and the international reluctance to intervene saw the worst genocide in decades.

In contrast to the enforcement limitations so sharply revealed by its interventions in Bosnia and Somalia, where armed militias resented external involvement and were prepared to demonstrate their feelings, the UN employed multidimensional approaches to peacekeeping in Cambodia and El Salvador which may yet provide a model for future UN activities. This was based on a stronger attempt to secure consensus rather than impose force, and it required co-operation between the state and the international community, and between UN peacekeepers and a host of other actors including civilian police and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It involved the UN in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building sometimes simultaneously. The UN mission was "not merely to create conditions for negotiations between the parties, but to develop strategies and support structures that would bring about a lasting peace."^{xxiv}

Although the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) operation eventually ended an awful war, repatriated 370,000 refugees, and organised an election and return to democratic rule, it failed to disarm the factions or to establish a neutral political environment. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) perhaps had more claim to success. It demobilised and converted the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) into a legal political party and ensured substantive human rights and civil reforms, though it was bedevilled by continuing economic sluggishness, a post-war crime wave, and the failure to complete the crucial redistribution of land.

In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* pointed to a future where regional organisations would play a more active role in peace processes. "As for regional organisations, Chapter VIII of the Charter defines the role they can play in the maintenance of peace and security. They have much to contribute [including] consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations."^{xxv} In five significant instances, regional bodies have played a direct enforcement and military role in an internal conflict: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Arab League in Lebanon, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Tajikistan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) in Bosnia. Fears of the hegemonic and national interests of the main force behind the groupings looms large within the state experiencing intervention, and carries the possibility of fomenting a domestic nationalist backlash. Nigeria's dominance of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, ECOWAS's military component) led to a serious conflict with Liberia and also Sierra Leone, while many former Soviet Republics are suspicious of Russian designs on empire and their dominance within the CIS. Syria's pre-eminence within the Arab Deterrent Force (Arab League's military component) of the 1980s also contributed to Israel's invasion, while NATO's multilateralism somewhat hindered its decisiveness and antagonised Russian nationalism. Thus, while regional organisations have the legal authority to enact the UN's will and are seemingly more attuned to local culture and history, they have not always been impartial brokers when taking on enforcement duties. In addition, the trans-boundary nature of these conflicts (especially in Africa) threatens the potential for interstate war. Old alliances are still important.

In more recent years, the UN has developed more inventive ways to involve friendly neighbouring powers in positive peacemaking. One particularly useful approach in both Cambodia (Australia, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, US) and El Salvador (Colombia, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela) was the use of 'Friends of the Secretary General,' an association of states aimed at providing leverage in support of the United Nation's objectives. These states can play the role of mediator or facilitator and have the resources to influence the domestic actors and bring along the international community they represent.

Conclusion

The UN's peacekeeping and humanitarian roles are fundamentally altering the 'new world order.' The central involvement of other actors, not least the belligerents themselves, in managing peace processes may be either welcomed or criticised, but has certainly been increasing. Potentially, it offers opportunities as well as a challenge to the UN.

The multidimensional approach developed in Cambodia and El Salvador, as described by Doyle and his colleagues, provides an attractive model for future UN peacekeeping. Apart from its degree of success in these two cases, the new approach is more appropriate for what may turn out to be the most significant development in international conflict during the 1990s—the tendency towards internally negotiated agreements, as opposed to external peacekeeping operations. It is more sensitive than military intervention to the changing pattern of peace processes: the need to improvise between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building; the brevity of the window of opportunity ('what the UN does not achieve early in the peace process, it may not achieve at all. '); the need to deal firmly and flexibly with recalcitrant parties; the need to compromise on parts of the agreement in order to maintain the whole mission (which has a strong echo in the mantra often heard during the Northern Ireland talks—'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'). However, US reluctance to engage UN peacekeepers following the Somalia debacle and the enormous costs of these comprehensive missions has diminished Security Council willingness to employ the multidimensional model. The peacekeeping budget dropped from \$3 billion in 1995 to \$1 billion in 1998, and the international political will for extensive peacekeeping missions has largely evaporated. So the multidimensional approach may have to delegate its tasks to the NGO community or to individual nation-states.

In the past, greater priority has been given to the cessation of hostilities than to the implementation of peace agreements. The significance of timing during both the period of violence and the subsequent peace process is illustrated by the use of the six structured accords which were cumulatively necessary to bring about what Boutros Boutros-Ghali called 'a revolution achieved by negotiation' in El Salvador. Yet the elation which follows the initial agreement is often followed by disillusion, as the other problems which remain to be resolved inexorably emerge from the woodwork to demand attention. In some cases, it may sometimes be preferable to layout a programme of agreements from the beginning, and to implement them to an agreed deadline or series of deadlines. Certainly the influence of the peacemakers starts its decline from the moment a peace accord is signed.

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Notes

- * 'Coming out of Violence' has been systematically monitoring the peace processes in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, the Basque Country, and Sri Lanka since 1996. It is administered from INCORE (The Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity) in Northern Ireland. Its findings will be published in a series of books by Macmillan Press during 1999.
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 - i. Some of which is discussed at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/metadata/agreement.html>. Angola, Israel/Palestine, Somalia, and Western Sahara each have a first (I) and second (II) accord. The two agreements were seen as sufficiently distinct temporally, often with different actors, and sometimes focusing on substantively unique issues. For instance, Labour as opposed to Likud in Israel, while Somali I was a product of UN and US peacekeeping forces, Somalia II was a more informal process mediated by Italy, Ethiopia, and Egypt to a degree which formed a National Salvation Council through the Sodere and Cairo agreements.
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- xxiii. *Lusaka Protocol*, signed at Lusaka, Zambia, 15 November 1994, Annex 8 (C) 2.1-2.3.
- xix. *Lusaka Protocol*, signed at Lusaka, Zambia, 15 November 1994, Annex 8 (C) 3.3.
- xx. *Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Agreement*, signed at Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2 December 1997. (Ga) Hill tracts regional *parishad* (3).
- xxi. *Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict*, signed at Paris, France, 23 October 1991, Part VI, Article 21.
- xxii. *San José Agreement: Annex Agreement on Human Rights*, signed at San José, Costa Rica, 26 July 1990, II (14) b,c,k.
- xxiii. *San Andres Accords: Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation*, signed at Mexico City, Mexico, 6 May 1996, preamble.
- xxiv. Doyle, *et.al.*, *op.cit.*
- xxv. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, NY, United Nations, 1992.

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- Bicesse Accord.* (Angola) 1991
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